In 2024, 154 attacks were carried out, 17 BLA, Sarmachars were martyred

In 2024, 154 attacks were carried out, 17 Sarmachars were martyred, while more than 66 personnel were killed and more than 101 were injured.

BLA In 2024, the Baloch Liberation Army carried out 154 attacks in the urban and rural areas of occupied Balochistan, causing significant damage to the state. As a result of these attacks, 66 personnel were killed, more than 110 were injured, and 8 spies were killed. Moreover, more than 30 properties were damaged, which caused disruptions to state structures and operations. Despite the so-called counter-insurgency efforts by the enemy, the BLA suffered the least casualties, and only 17 Sarmachars were martyred throughout the year, which shows the organized and coordinated strategy of the organization.

The BLA’s operations were geographically divided into 60 percent urban and 40 percent rural areas, reflecting the organization’s strategic flexibility in different areas. Urban operations focused on immediate and disruptive tactics, including “hit-and-run” attacks, grenade attacks, and killings of informants and operatives, which created constant psychological pressure among state forces and their aides. On the other hand, rural operations took advantage of the rugged and mountainous terrain of the area to use ambushes and IEDs. The organization’s success in these areas highlighted its tactical expertise. The Sarmachars demonstrated excellent defensive tactics by repelling extensive ground and air military offensives, particularly in the Kalat mountain range and elsewhere.

IED attacks proved to be the most effective weapon, used in 52.85 percent of operations. Especially in Gwadar and related areas, the Sarmachars used modern urban guerrilla warfare to psychologically paralyze the enemy throughout the year. As a result of these operations, several important and sensitive state projects in the region, including the last elections in Gwadar, failed or faced extraordinary delays. In particular, the inauguration of the Gwadar Airport, established in partnership with Pakistan and China, was shamefully suspended and delayed due to the fear of continuous attacks by the BLA in the area. In all interior areas, except the coastal areas, the Sarmachars made the best use of explosives and inflicted losses on the enemy.

Ambush attacks (19.51 percent) and grenade attacks (21.14 percent) further diversified the operational methods of the organization, where ambush attacks proved effective in rural areas and grenade attacks succeeded in causing significant disruption in urban centers. Shooting down spies and collaborators (6.50 percent) was strategically used to disrupt state intelligence networks and disrupt collaboration with the occupying forces.

Occupying forces and state structures remained the primary targets of the organization, with 57.14 percent of attacks targeting the occupying forces. The BLA played a key role in sabotaging the so-called state elections, and 28.57 percent of operations were carried out targeting polling stations and election activities. These efforts were successful in several areas, where the organization effectively disrupted the re-election process and prevented voters from participating. In addition, arson attacks (8.57 percent) were carried out to destroy state and force installations, including spy towers and mineral transport vehicles.

The year’s activities highlighted several organizational strategic strengths. The BLA demonstrated exceptional operational performance, using effective guerrilla tactics to maximize impact and minimize its losses. The organization’s high level of secrecy and discipline ensured operational continuity and resistance. By targeting electoral infrastructure, the organization severely disrupted election campaigns in Kohlu, Kahan, Kharan, Washik, Kech, and other key areas, including Gwadar. The continued hit-and-run strategy in urban areas further complicated state strategies. Meanwhile, the use of IEDs in coastal and rural areas was able to significantly disrupt state mobility and logistics.

By suppressing death squads and intelligence aides in areas including Kahan, Kharan, and Kalat, the organization consolidated its hold on key interior areas. These actions eliminated immediate threats as well as increased the organization’s influence and territorial control. Overall, the BLA demonstrated a deep strategy of asymmetric warfare, effectively balancing urban disruption with rural dominance, and achieved its far-reaching objectives.

The BLA’s 2024 activities reflect guerrilla expertise and strategic insight. The organization’s ability to sustain high-impact operations with minimal losses demonstrates its organizational strength and adaptability.