Identity politics against the Baloch in Iran and Pakistan

Introduction

To explore the historical background of Baloch, historians have largely relied on studying the cultural and linguistic connections between the Baloch and other ethnic groups in the region as the primary means to trace their origins. There is little documentary evidence to define the Baloch identity, but relatively thorough investigation into Baloch history and language was conducted by Dames in 1904, who had identified Kerman (located in present-day Iran) as a plausible point of origin for the Baloch (M. Ahmed & Baloch, Citation2015, p. 2). The Baloch were pastoralist or semi nomads and had routine migrations along established routes between focal grazing areas (Breseeg, Citation2004; Dashti, Citation2012; Wirsing, Citation2008). They had been moving in the south and eastern fringes of the Iranian Plateau for almost 3000 years. The settlement process to a permanent territory of the Baloch started in the 12th century on an area stretching through Persia, Afghanistan and India. In a span of centuries, and in the process of migration and settlement the Baloch incorporated many smaller groups (Breseeg, Citation2004; Dashti, Citation2012; Wirsing, Citation2008) yet they kept their distinctive tribal associations (Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 22) and they still feel pride to associate themselves with their tribal kin. The assemblage of smaller groups was to safeguard themselves against their powerful neighbours, Persia, Afghanistan, and the sub-continent of India. A significant turning point in Baloch history took place during the 14th century when Mir Chakar Khan Rind established the first tribal confederacy among the Baloch tribes, aiming to unite them under a loosely structured administrative system (Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 139). This confederacy extended from Kirman in the west to Afghanistan in the northeast, and from Sindh and Punjab in the southeast to the Arabian Sea in the south. Chakar Khan’s efforts towards Baloch unification marked a notable and meaningful initiative. It was in 1666 when the first Kalat confederacy was established and surpassed Chakar Khan’s confederation in terms of size and coherence (M. Ahmed, Citation2013, p. 99). During the eighteenth century the 6th Khan of Kalat, Mir Naseer Khan consolidated most of the land wherein Baloch tribes were settled into an arrangement of feudal state with its stretch from southeastern Afghanistan, Makran (Pakistan), Kharan to Murdar Peak in Quetta (Pakistan), and all the way to Bandar Abbas (Iran), including Dera Ghazi Khan on the edge of Punjab (Pakistan) (Ahmad, Citation1992, p. 76; Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 150). Under Mir Naseer Khan rule the confederacy grew stronger, with a regular army of around 25,000 personnel, a bureaucratic system, and two legislative councils known as the House of Lords and the House of Commons (M. Ahmed & Baloch, Citation2015, p. 3).

It was in the mid-nineteenth century the British paid some attention to this land – Kalat Confederacy – due to its strategic location, which served as a line of defence between the Russian and British Empires. It provided access to British forces into Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan and asserted their influence in the region (Dunne, Citation2006:19; Foreign Policy Centre (FPC), Citation2006, p. 13; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 7; Siddiqi, Citation2012b, p. 158). “At that time Kalat was a very small and uninfluential state. The Khans, therefore, gradually engaged the assistance of the chiefs of their kindred tribes in the neighborhood by giving them fiefs in Kalat. In certain specified cases and numbers, for the aid of the Khan” (P. Ahmed et al., Citation2015, p. 62). A secured route for British commercial and military convoys was carved out through the confederacy after multiple treaties with local rulers both through political dialogue and forceful military actions (Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 159; Marri, Citation2014, p. 17); but the people living in Kalat Confederacy – an area under the jurisdiction of Mir Nasir Khan II – rejected the agreements. The locals retaliated against this arrangement and attacked British troops. To counter these attacks, the British Army with modern technology and far more powerful than the locals took strong military action against the indigenous tribes. The military advent ended up in trifurcation of the region (FPC, Citation2006, p. 13). Each part was given away to three states: Persia, Afghanistan, and British India (Dashti, Citation2017, p. 3; A. Khan, Citation2009, p. 1073; S. Khan, Citation2021, pp. 38–40; Siddiqi, Citation2012b, p. 158). Under the trifurcation arrangement, 25% of the Confederacy went to the Persian territory through the Goldsmith LineFootnote¹ in 1871 (FPC, Citation2006, p. 13; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 40). The demarcation of Durand LineFootnote² between Afghanistan and British India resulted in the division of the northern part of the confederacy (S. Khan, Citation2021:40; Qassem, Citation2007, p. 66). The arrangement under the trifurcation further strengthened and confined the groups into their own boundaries instead of assimilating with other groups. Heraclides sees it as “retribalization instead of detribalization” (Heraclides, Citation1991, p. 7).

Present day Balochistan is a legacy of the trifurcation and international recognition of the drawn contours on this region divided into three states: Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Baloch population scattered in Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

In the course of history, the Baloch developed into an independent linguistic and cultural community with the largest concentration found in Pakistan, followed by Iran, Afghanistan, Oman, Bahrain, and Turkmenistan (Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 64; Dashti, Citation2017, pp. 1–3; Samad, Citation2014, p. 306; Taheri, Citation2012, p. 7). The strong affinity within the ethnic group refused to recognize new boundaries that had divided families and tribes across the borders. Strong societies like Baloch who live in weak states like Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan have kept their separate identity intact with a strong social network within the boundaries. Artificially created borders not only divided but also compelled incoherent assemblage of disparate and mutually resentful groups to live together – an ideal recipe for a continued feud (Esman, Citation2004, p. 69). Nationalism, originating from European philosophy two centuries ago, has successfully reshaped the global political map by establishing nation-states across the entire land surface, excluding Antarctica. However, the integration of ethnic or cultural minorities within these states remains imperfect, leading to significant challenges and frequent failures in the process of national integration – a critical issue in the contemporary world (Birch, Citation1989, p. 3).

The Baloch people – the subject of this article – best illustrate how partition of their region divided and scattered them across three different and internationally recognized states, resulting in continued frustration and antagonistic relationships with the controlling governments of these regions. A commonality within three states for the Baloch is that in all cases they live far below the socio-economic conditions of the respective majority groups. “Socio-economic disparities between regions are a manifestation of factors which are predominantly structural in nature and embedded within the social, economic, cultural, historical, political, and environmental milieu of the area and form an inherent part of the society” (Huda et al. Citation2011, p. 38). The disparity has created constant conflict and morphed into identity-based political factionalism with the exception of the identity markers. In a society, the identity markers define their space and draw confinement boundaries wherein they interact within the group only. Guelke (Citation2012) relates this confinement as a reason that engenders deeply divided societies and restricts the assimilation and cohesion. The Baloch of either side believe that the state controlled by the majority ethnic group adopts discriminatory policies against them both in Iran and Pakistan, and this is due to their identity. Interestingly the same ethnic group with similar complaints against their state register them with different identity markers: sectarian and ethnic.

This article examines how identity markers are exploited by the state centre in Iran and Pakistan and have led to the plight of the Baloch in these two countries. The emphasis in the article is to investigate the role of state towards its minority as Asim says, when a state associates national identity with a specific sect or ethnic group like in Iran and Pakistan, this association can trigger the minority groups to raise their demands (Asim, Citation2023, p. 14). Nevertheless, the qualitative components of inequality cannot be measured using statistical data on social and economic conditions. Reports with absolute numbers, percentages, ratios, and indicators may highlight the figurative details but cannot portray or express the open and covert discrimination and marginalization in a society with the people who are in any way different from the majority. This article will bring forth an analysis by evaluating the available literature and reports.

The following section constructs a scaffolding to flesh out the theoretical reasoning of the rife between the central government and the peripheral area.

Theoretical framework

In any society, the absence of equal opportunities for all always creates a competitive environment between haves and have nots. The latter group often associates its deprivation with its identity, which further obstructs its assimilation with the rest of society. Confinement within group boundaries not only weakens society but also impacts its social contract with state. Whenever a group feels marginalized and discriminated against; identity becomes a powerful and potent political tool to raise its voice and mobilize. Identity-based politics is an act wherein the people rationally pursue their interests, “yet those interests are constrained by the identity context in which they operate” (McCauley, Citation2014, p. 802). Guelke identifies common sources of division in societies around the world, which are: class, caste, religion, language, race, ethnicity, and clan. He further adds binary divisions like settler versus native; immigrant versus indigenous population; pastoralist versus native; peasant versus landowner; urban versus rural; and centre versus periphery (Guelke, Citation2012, p. 14). While analyzing other potential sources of division in society, Guelke ascribes ethnic cleavages more prone to political conflict (Guelke, Citation2012, p. 20). Ethnic identity is not an acquired attribute, rather it is an inherited ascription based on common culture (social values, language, norms, and rituals), faith, religion, and racial features (Esman, Citation2004, p. 28; Smith Citation1979, p. 22; Tambiah, Citation1989, p. 335). The group assemblage on the basis of distinct identity – ethnicity – makes it identifiable among others and significantly more powerful than any other bondage within the society to which Guelke (Citation2012, p. 20) refers as ethnonationalism. Whether real or perceived, targeted discrimination ignites the flame of nationalist fervour (Mayall, Citation1990, p. 70). The discrimination may not be on ethnic lines; however, a marginalized group can translate it into an ethnic/religious claim, which is very powerful and also a gelling factor (Esman, Citation2004, p. 36; Horowitz, Citation1985, p. 97).

The societies which are divided on the basis of ethnoreligious identity not only challenge the legitimacy of state but also create a conducive environment for violence. On the one hand, the state is neglectful towards segments of its society, as in the case of the Baloch in Iran and Pakistan. On the other hand, the neglected segment resorts to physical violence to demonstrate their vengeance and resentment against the discriminatory policies.

The question that follows these observations is why and how the Baloch community has been oppressed on the basis of its distinct ethnic and religious identity. In this juncture the concept of structural violence offers a vantage point to unpack the Baloch case. According to Johan Galtung (Citation1969) structural violence is force applied upon people based on pre-existing social arrangements that prevent the realization of the full human potential and the satisfaction of basic development needs. Unlike direct physical violence, structural violence is silent, it does not show: it is essentially static. Galtung further explains that, in a static society, personal violence is obvious and can be registered but structural violence is imbued in the system as the air around us. It allows inequality to persist and has an institutional bias against a certain group. The set of all such systems of interaction, for a given set of actors, can then be referred to as a structure. And in a structure an actor may have consistently low rank in comparison with another actor – “the violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances” (Galtung, Citation1969, pp. 170–175). The analysis draws on the notion of systematic structural violence in the state institutional apparatus that remains the invisible frame within a state structure. The disenfranchised group of people in reaction may resort to visible violence resisting marginalization (Esman, Citation2004, p. 19; Horowitz, Citation1985, p. 135; Rubenstein, Citation2017, p. 31).

Given the Baloch issue on both sides and the weaker state capacities in Iran and Pakistan, another way to look at the issue is the failings of a state to deal with its citizens. Researchers can use Iran and Pakistan case studies when examining the causes and effects of weak statism. The authors have, therefore, examined the issue both by Galtung’s prism of structural violence and weak statism due to state’s fragility in order to pinpoint the causes of politics against Baloch by their respective states. One or both of these causes may exist. It is a state’s responsibility to provide equal opportunities and fair distribution of public goods to all its people. Lack of access to equality and fairness could lead to frustration, grievance and probably aggression by the deprived communities. Due to its own inability to maintain social cohesion, a fragile state creates space for disgruntled groups within its borders who can potentially challenge the state’s authority (Kress, Citation2012, p. 865). A state which fails to treat its people in equitable manner and cannot provide security and basic civic necessities is vulnerable to both “intra” and “inter” state conflicts (Wolff, Citation2011, p. 955). These observations allow us to expand our inquiry and question the mechanisms, processes, and institutions (formal and informal) that prevent people from satisfying their needs and constrict their rightful options of fair share.

Balochistan: a historical overview

Balochistan is an underdeveloped region wherein people are struggling for their socio-politico-economic rights (Hamid et al., Citation2019, p. 133; Sial & Basit, Citation2012, pp. 10–11). Both in Iran and Pakistan, the Baloch attribute their low quality-of-life to their identity markers oscillating between ethnicity in Pakistan and sectarianism in Iran. The formidable task for any researcher is always collection of data, which in the case of Balochistan of both sides is more challenging due to lack of reliable sources. The institutional presence in the Pakistani side of Balochistan is minimal and that is also understaffed and under-resourced. Access to the Iranian side of Balochistan’s data is another daunting task because of sensitivity of the topic and stringent censorship laws in Iran (Manghebati, Citation2015, p. 13). In the next sections, despite all limitations and available data, the authors have tried to analyze the living conditions of Baloch on both sides.

Baloch in Pakistan

Present day Balochistan in Pakistan or Eastern Balochistan (hereafter EB) comprises an area that Pakistan has inherited as a result of decolonization of the British India in 1947, and subsequent accession of the Kalat Agency and its three peripheral states – Kharan, Makran, and Lasbela in 1948. EB is Pakistan’s largest province in terms of area and covers 347,190 square kilometres, or 43.6% of the country’s total land (Dashti, Citation2017; Feyyaz, Citation2013:115; GOB,Footnote³ 2021:220;3; Noraiee, Citation2020:72; S. Khan, Citation2021:5). The demarcated boundaries of today’s EB are marked with British–Afghan warsFootnote⁴ and the colonial political designs (S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 5). According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS),Footnote⁵ Balochistan is the largest yet sparsely populated province in Pakistan. Based on the latest census in 2017 the population of the province is around 12 million (12,344,408), which is almost 6% of the total population of Pakistan (207,774,000) that includes two dominant ethnic groups – Pashtun and Baloch. The average population density in Pakistan is 260.88 persons per square kilometre, whereas it is merely 35.53 persons per square kilometre in Balochistan (PBS, 2021; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 6). With Quetta its capital city, EB is Pakistan’s most diverse province with a population mix. Almost 45% Baloch (excluding Brahvis), mainly clustered in the south of EB, closely followed by the second largest group – Pashtun, who make up almost 32% of the total. Pashtun are settled in Quetta and its periphery in the north, the adjoining areas of KP. In addition to Baloch and Pashtun, Brahvis, Sindhis, Punjabi, Hazara, Makrani people of African descent, and many other smaller nations are currently residing in EB, making it most diverse region. There is a noticeable non-Muslim population: Hindu (0.49%), Christians (0.40%), Qadiani (0.15%), and Scheduled Castes (0.10%) (A. Khan, Citation2009, p. 1071; Feyyaz, Citation2013, p. 115; PBS, 2017, p. 5; S. Khan, Citation2021, Z. A. Khan, Citation2012, p. 10). The Baloch society has a tribal structure with major tribes to be Marri, Bugti, Brauhi, Jamaldini, Rakhshani, Bizenjo, Boleidai, Bangulzai, Umrani, Jamali, Qaisarani, and Khetran, among others (Breseeg, Citation2004, p. 60).

Situating the conflict in Balochistan is not possible unless its historical background is studied. During the British rule, the entire Balochistan within British Indian territorial boundaries was an outsourced territory administered by a small group of elites who were uninterested in developing the region despite the fact that it contained vast amounts of hydrocarbons, minerals, and other natural resources. The British took control of the region after two Afghan Wars and signing different treaties, as have been mentioned in preceding paragraphs. It was Sir Robert Grove Sandeman – a British Army Officer who was later deputed as political agent to look after the administrative affairs of Balochistan excluding the Kalat Agency and its peripheral princely states. His major task was to safeguard British interests in this farthest territory of British India. Sandeman introduced a new administrative model –Shahi JirgaFootnote⁶ (Grand Council), after dismantling a centuries-old local traditional administrative and judicial system of Jirga.Footnote⁷ Sandeman’s “reformatory” Shahi Jirga was a shrewd colonial mechanism of indirect rule through a few carefully selected tribal leaders –Nawabs and Sardars (S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 41; Kupecz, Citation2012, p. 99; Mirza, Citation2013, p. 22; Noraiee, Citation2020, p. 73). In exchange for their allegiance to the British Crown, the Sardars were granted vast administrative powers over their tribes and were conferred titles and rewards like Khilyat (royal gowns), Bakhshish (prizes both in cash and kind), and a special place in Darbar (royal court) (Grare, Citation2006, p. 6; Marri, Citation2014, p. 49). These nobles were also allowed to establish private militias and armed tribal bands to suppress any uprising against the British administration or British convoys. After 1947, the same “selected” tribal leaders took over the administrative affairs of the periphery as they were deeply entrenched in the system. “State building was a matter of low priority during the period of colonial rule in Quetta’s hinterland compared with strategic, military and political concerns. This imbalance continued in the post-colonial period” (Gazdar et al., Citation2010, p. 1). The leadership in the centre also relied on them for their administrative convenience and continued with colonial legacy of indirect rule.

Since independence in 1947 and the subsequent accession of the Kalat Agency and its three peripheral states, there is a constant complaint against the central government of Pakistan, which is largely categorized and identified as ethnic conflict. Disenfranchisement and alienation between EB and the federal government are the root cause of recurring political crises. It is a weakness of the state and its institutions that no genuine effort has been made until recently to engage and integrate the disgruntled and aggrieved party (M. Ahmed, Citation2020, p. 1). It is therefore not surprising if EB has yet to emerge as a prominent feature on a mainstream political canvass, which was given the status of a province in 1972 after the cessation of Bangladesh. From 1947 to 1972, the largest province in terms of area remain unattended and administered in the same colonial style. Neither the central government nor the local chieftains were interested in its development; rather they were more concerned in protecting their interests and securing a larger share in the government’s political and economic banks (S. Khan, Citation2021, pp. 51–52; Mazhar et al., Citation2012, p. 113). The successive governments in Pakistan, instead of strengthening the state institutions and reaching out the farthest region and people, relied on local political elite. The symbiotic relationship between the federal and provincial political for its administrative convenience is the major issue that has failed to resolve the genuine issues of people living in Balochistan regardless of their ethnic background. Pakistan as a state has failed not just to offer political goods to its people, but also to properly manage internal affairs, resulting in a bitter and frequently violent climate. Balochistan’s citizens are not only frustrated, but they are also enraged when basic requirements are not met (Javaid, Citation2010, p. 117). The ineffectiveness of state and consecutive governments with minimum opportunities to accommodate diverse ethnic communities makes EB a perfect recipe for conflict and competition. Political unwillingness combined with access to limited resources has become a major contentious issue in multiethnic political entity like EB, which suffices the requirement of a violent conflict (Demmers, Citation2012, p. 6; Esman, Citation2004, p. 30; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 107).

The conflict between the state and the periphery has witnessed two major insurgencies, occurring from 1973 to 1977 and from 2006 onwards, as well as three localized uprisings in 1948, 1958, and 1963. These were guerrilla movements that were ultimately suppressed by the Pakistan army. The first insurgency was triggered by the army’s attempt to overthrow the Khan of Kalat on charges of treason. The second insurgency emerged following the imposition of One Unit,Footnote⁸ led by the deposed Khan’s brother. Pakistan used state force and the army was ordered to crush the uprising, which resulted in violence across the province. The third phase started when, in 1963, Sher Mohammad Marri organized a new guerrilla movement in response to the military garrisons in the province. The conflict ended with a ceasefire in 1969 after the dissolution of the One Unit Scheme. All these three localized uprisings were short lived and took place in a limited area. But the major insurgency occurred between 1973 and 1977, when the government of Pakistan not only imposed emergency rule and ousted the civilian government of Balochistan but used airstrikes attacking the militants, including civilians. The army, with the help of the Iranian government, quelled the uprising. The current phase of insurgency, which has continued in the form of a low-intensity armed conflict since, in 2006, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a prominent Baloch sardar, was killed in an ambush between the militants and the Pakistan army. This led to widespread protests and riots across Baloch-dominated areas, with significant displacement and allegations of human rights abuses. The killing of Bugti further fuelled Baloch nationalist sentiment and mobilization. Protests in response to the killings of Baloch leaders or other significant issues have continued, indicating a growing urbanization of Baloch protest movements. The basic reason for the continued violence and agitation is the uneven modernization (Gazdar et al., Citation2010, pp. 3–4). EB, in comparison to the progress and development in other provinces, is far behind. According to a Natural Disaster Consortium (NDC) report issued in 2019, out of the total population of Pakistan almost 39% are multi-dimensionally poor.Footnote⁹ However, EB provides the majority of that 39%, as 71% of its residents, regardless of their ethnic background, are multi-dimensionally poor (IPC, Citation2019:5). The state’s indifference towards its periphery, institutional marginalization, and the role of the political elite have added to the weak centre–periphery relationship (M. Ahmed & Baloch, Citation2015; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 98; Sial & Basit Citation2010, p. 13, 279). The political elite is one of the influential groups which controls the power within a state and designs the state paradigm that’s suits their vested interests. In political science, this influence is referred to as elite capture, which exerts its control over decision-making processes, resources or institutions, often to the detriment of broader societal interests. In such scenarios, the elite, by virtue of their position, manipulate or exploit systems for their own benefit, sidelining the interests and needs of the wider population. The key players of elite capture or entrepreneurs “capitalize on certain forms of identity by creating or politicking existing communal identities which they use as a political resource” (Barry, Citation2023, p. 48).

The elite capture in EB due to an artificially imposed leadership thrives on corruption. The unwillingness of the central government in reaching out to the people and relying on local lords further adds to the miseries of people of EB, be they Baloch, Brahvi, or Pashtun. The avoidable conditions, like inaccessibility to basic facilities (housing, health care, and education) make the EB a classical demonstration of Galtung’s structural violence theory. Besides the provision of civic amenities, no preventive measures are taken to protect the people from harsh weather and natural calamities like drought or flash flooding. Frequent drought spells, which persist for longer periods have adversely impacted the socio-economic condition of people living in EB. Subsistence living is the norm for the people of EB, who have the least government support and institutional safeguards. Lack of job opportunities further reduces their options for living.

One of the most contentious issues between the people of EB and central government is usurpation, dispossession, and expropriation of natural resources in EB such as natural gas, copper, uranium, gold, coal, silver, platinum, as well as potential oil reserves (Chandio & Mariya, Citation2013, p. 1048; Dashti, Citation2017, pp. 195–196; M. Ahmed & Baloch, Citation2015, p. 275; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 98; Sial &Basit, Citation2010, p. 19). Natural gas was discovered in EB in 1952 and was available to the rest of Pakistan both for industrial and domestic usage, but the centre failed to provide it to the people of EB, even for domestic use (S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 98). Gas was not only provided to the households in a large part of the country but industries in Faisalabad, Sialkot, Lahore, Gujranwala, and Karachi also benefitted from the cheap fuel (gas) from EB (Laif & Hamza, Citation2000, p. 60). Quetta was the first city in EB which was provided with gas in 1983 through a 370 kilometres transmission line (A. Khan, Citation2009, p. 1075:130). It was the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), which pressurized the central government to provide fuel to the households in EB, fearing the extinction of forests, particularly Juniper forestsFootnote¹⁰ (IUCN, 2000:95). The international pressure worked and the supply of gas was made possible through pipelines to a few districts in EB like Khuzdar, Ziarat, Lasbella, and Dera Bugti (Laif & Hamza, Citation2000, p. 60).

The second institutional discrimination against the people of EB, which cuts across domestic politics in Pakistan, is the domination of the Punjabi ethnic group on the state apparatus – share in central government’s political, civil, and military milieu (Hassan, Citation2019, p. 139; S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 100). Punjabi make up the dominant majorityFootnote¹¹ in Pakistan, with 52.96% (PBS 2017) of the population, and has been accused of usurping the rights of smaller ethnic groups since 1947. Punjabi domination in Pakistan is not by design but the scanty population of EB inclusive of Baloch, Pashtun, Brahvi, and other smaller groups, which is a mere 5% (6,281,087) of the people (PBS, 2017), keeping its share marginal.

Punjabi’s control on the state apparatus owes to its population size and also due to British legacy. The British employed Punjabis more than the other communities due to its large population . Additionally, large agricultural tax collection from Punjab was another attraction that forced the British to invest more in Punjab than other areas, particularly if compared with EB – an arid, barren land with its sparse and scattered population that had very less to contribute to the British economy (S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 101). However, even after independence, the Pakistani government has not made any serious effort to develop the area and invest in infrastructure that can ameliorate the living conditions of people of EB.

Baloch have serious reservations about their already small population and allege that the state of Pakistan with the help of Pakistan Army is turning EB into a Baloch minority area by facilitating Pashtun to settle in Balochistan (S. Khan, Citation2021, p. 104). It is important to understand that EB is an ethnically divided territory, wherein Pashtuns are historically settled in the north; and Baloch and Brahvi migrated and settled in the south of EB. The Baloch during their early migration period settled not only in south EB but in adjoining areas of south Punjab and north-east Sindh. This adds to their feeble presence in EB.

Relating to Baloch allegation in relation to Pashtun settlement, it is argued that, during two Afghan wars: 1) when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in the 1980s and 2) when the US led a NATO forces’ operation in 2001, forced many Afghans to take refuge in Pakistan. The Afghan refugees who migrated to Pakistan were from different ethnic backgrounds, such as Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, and other smaller groups including Turkmen and Baloch, however Pashtuns were the largest in number (Gazdar et al., Citation2010, p. 17). The migration from Afghanistan is a persistent phenomenon, which has continued even after NATO forces’ withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021. The largest refugee settlement is in KP and erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which are now merged in KP. As per the United Nations Human Refugees Commission Report 2021, Pakistan has been hosting Afghan refugees for more than 40 years.

The UNHCRFootnote¹² (2021) statistical analysis explaining the Afghan refugees registered settlement in different areas of Pakistan is shown in Table 1.

Notes